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We develop a model in which a shareholder hires a director to mon-
itor a manager who faces stochastic firing costs. We study thc optimal
incentive scheme for the director, allowing for the possibility that the
manager bribes the director in order to change his firing intentions.
Such collusion may be in the interest of the shareholder, because it
avoids the need to (ex ante) compensate the manager for very high
realisations of his firing costs (these are precisely the cases in wlrich
collusion occurs).
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Even arnong capitalist economies there are pronomtced differences in the way
corporations are run. In the United States, for example, most of the large
finns are supervised by a Board of Directors (BoD). The BoD is composed of
outside directors as well as executive directors, who are involved in the day-
to-day management of the firm. The ultimate power, however, rests with the
shareholders, who always have the possibility to fire the management. The
Anglo-Svton system is therefore oft.en cited as an example of how corporate
management should be organised in Continental-European countries, where
shazeholders have much less infiuence on the way the company is run.
In Continental Europe it is common to have a separation between the
management and the BoD. In such a two-tier system, the BoD often acts as
an autonomous body which is beyond the control of the shareholders.~ It
is frequently azgued that this lack of shareholder power gives rise to situa-
tions in which the management and the BoD mutually protect each other
at the expense of the shareholder. In this paper, however, we argue that
such cc~llusion between management and directors is not always bad for the
shareholders.
To show why this may be the case, consider a simple two-period model
of a firm which hires a manager at the start of the first period. The match
between the manager and the firm may turn out to be either good or bad.
The quality of the match is beyond the control of the manager or the firm:
it is merely a"move by Nature". If the mat.ch is bad, the shareholder would
like to fire the manager at the end of the first period.z At that moment
the manager also learns about the firing cost he will íncur and for whích he
needs to be compensated ex ante in order to be willing to run the firm. In
the ideal situation, the shareholder would observe this firing cost. also ar~d
be able to commit ex ante to not firing the manager in those cases in which
his firing cost exceeds the expected gain from hiring a new manager.
Rather realistically, however, we assume that the shareholder can only
learn about the quality of the match through t.he observation of the firm's
first-period cash-flow. Moreover, the shareholder does not observe the rcal-
isation of the firing cost. Therefore, the shareholder ma,y want to delegate
the power whether or not to fire the manager to a director who monitors
r An example are the Netherlands, where only the BoD has a right to appoint or to fite
the management. The BoD also appoints its own successors, without interference from
the shareholders (see, for example, hloerland (1995)(.
~ With some slight abuse of terminology, we will refer to the manager as being good
(bad) if the yuality of the match between the manager and the firm is good (had).
1the company more closely and thus can make better informed dacisions. If
the firing cost of a(bad) manager turns out to be relatively high, he has
the incentive to bribe the diractor not to fire him. The possibility of such
collusion may be in the interest of the shareholder, because it saves him the
resources necded to compensate the manager ex ante for potentially high
realisat.ions of the firing cost. Thus, collusion avoids part, of the deadweight.
losses associated with firing decisions. Indeed, this may be an important ad-
vantage of the Continental-European style of corporate management when
comparecí with the Anglo-Saxon system, where managers' salaries ofcompa-
nies of comparable size are generally much higher [see, for example, Conyon
et al. (1995), and the Economist (1995a,b)J.
In practice, there are various types of costs the manager incurs when he
is fired. These can take the form of foregone income as well as the loss of
resources in the process of searching for a new job and moving to another
place. But there may also be other, less tangible costs, such as the loss
of reputation and valuable contacts. It is reasonable to assume that these
costs are, at least. partly, uuknown ex ante, for example because it is not
clear what the manager's job market position or legal position will be in the
future.
For simplicity, the model assumes that collusion between the manager
and the director takes place through a monetary transfer from the fornrer to
the latter. In reality, however, such a bribe would often be less tangible. For
example, in a corporate system wit.h int.erlocking directorships and strong
informal ties across firms the manager might recommend the director at
other firms for a directorship. Another esample would be a tightening of
buyer-seller relations between the manager's firm and firms in which the
director has a stake r'r of which he is manager himself.
Our paper is related to a principal-agent literatnre which focuses on
designing compensation schemes t.hat a shareholder can use to extract the
optimal level of effort from a manager.~ This standard model has been
extended to incorporat.e a supervisnr ~s anot.her layer betweeu the. principal
and the agent [e.g. Baron and Besanko (1984)]. According to Kofman
and Lawarrée (1993), however, `the research in this area has by and large
neglected the possibility of collusion.'
An important exception is Tirole (1986), who adds a set of `coalition
incentive compatibility constraints' to the usual individual rationality and
`~For example, Ross (1973), Hulmstrom (19ï9), Grossman and Hart (]983), and Holm-
strom and 1`lilgrom (1987). For empirical evidence on incentive cvmpensation, see, for
example, Jensen and ivlurphy (1990) and Garen (1994).
Lincentive compatibility constraints, such that the Hnal allocation is coalítion
proof. Kofinan and Lawarrée (1996) develop a model in which it may be
optimal for the principal to allow for collusion. However, this result is ob-
tained because deterring collusion is costly iu their modcl. In eontrrust, in
our model, even if it is costless to prevent collusion, allowing for collusion
between management and director can be beneHcial to thc~ principal.
Our argument is developed in the following steps. Section 2 presents the
basic modeL In Section 3 we study the benchmark case ot a shareholder
who, after one period, catt observe the ntanager's type (good or bad) as
well as his firing cost. ~foreover, thc shareholder is ahle to commit at the
start of the first period (when contracts are signed) to a firing rule based
on the realisation of the Hring cost. This is the ideal situation with the
highest payoff for the shareholder. Section 4 relaxes the assurnption that
the shareholder can observe the type and the firing cost of the manager.
The sharcholder receives onl,y a noisy signal in the form of a realisation of
the firm's cash-How. He therefore fixes a threshold for the cash-flow. If
the cash-flow is below (above) this threshold he fires (retains) the manager.
The next step (Section 5) then is to delegate the firing decision to a director,
who has an information advantage LcY:ause he monitors the mana.ear moTe
closely. The salary of the director depends on the cash-How of the firm.
The manager receives a Hxed salary as wel] as a Hxed severance payrnent
which is paid only when he is fired. I3ecause a higher severance payruent
reduces the incentive of a bad manager to bribe the director, the shareholder
would want to set it as high as possible if collusion is undesirable. However,
in those cases where it is desirable to allow for collusion, the severance
payment will help to enscae that firing takes place only when thc realised
firing cost. is relatively low. Section 6 explores under what conditions the
shareholder would allow collusion, even if he were able to prevent it (e.g.,
through intensified monitoring of the director) without any cost. Section 7
concludes t.he paper.
2 The Basic Model
We consider a two-period model without discounting and in which all agents
are risk neutral. CZualitatively speaking, t.he assiuuption of risk neutrality
does not affect our results. A firm is owned by a shareholcíer, who randomly
selects a manage,r at the start of the first period. The cash-How generated
by the firm in any given period depends on how the firm and the rnanager
Ht together. At the moment the manager is selected neither he uor the
3shareholder knows how good the match will be. A manager fits the firm
well if he is `the right man at the right time at t.he right place'. Such a
manager is called a'good' manager. A manager that does not fit the firm
well is called a`bad' ntanager.
The firm's cash-flow in a given period, x, is stochastic. It depends not
only on the type uf the rnanager but also on random factors which are
beyoncí his control. If the manager is gooci, the distribution of the cash-How
is described by a densit.y function f~-(x). Similarly, if he is bad, the deusity
function of the cash-fíow is fg(x). Details about the density functions are
reported in Figure 1. Both density fuuctions are restricted to the domaiu
(0, X], X 7 0. They are linear with a slope X for the good manager
and slope -~ for the bad manager. Thus, a good manager has a higher
probability of producing a higher cashHow. The expected cash-How of the
firm when the rnanager is good (bad) is )r~ (~~). Without loss of generality
we assmne that the a pvzori probabilities of the manager being good or bad,
Pr{G} and Pr{B}, respectively, are both equal to 2. Hence, the expect.ed
cash-fíow generated by a randomly selected manager is ji - Pr{B}jea -I-
Pr{G})c~. Because of the assumed symmetry, Fe~ - jr - ji -~B - ~Ec.
Hence, OFa is the (absolute) difle~e,ice between the average expwtted cash-
flow and the expected cash-How under a good or bad manager.
i,..~ m~,~ ~.
n ,~,~~.,~ N,..i.~i~~r~. r.tet - ~
F~,tsi - ~ - ~~
v~ - }X
n ,~.~~.~ ~~,,,i,wi~~wr P.(c) - }
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(i~-Vll)- (l~(: -V) - 0Y - nX
j~~i r
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1`lanagers have a reservation wage of W,,, 1 0 in each period. At. the
end oí the first period, the manager can either be ret.ainecí or he fired and
replaced by another manager. This decision will of course depend on the
available information about the type of the manager, as we will see below.
A manager who is fired incurs a personal firing cost c. The firing cost
is stochastic and uniformly distributed on the interval [O,C,]. We assume
4that it is (statistically) independent of the cash-flow under either t,ype of
tnanager. The realisation of the firing cost is revealed to the manager at the
end of the first. period.
To induce tlre manager to nm the firm he must be compensated somehow
for his expected firing cost, which we cíenote by c~. Of course, r.e depends
on the probability that the manager will be fired. This, on its turn, depends
on the specific arrangements (e.g., a director who can be bribed) t.o be
considered below. Compensation takes place through a fixed salary s, and
a 6xed severance payment, p 1 0, which the manager receives in the case
he gets fired.4 Iience, in the first. period his participation constraint is given
by:
W G s f pe - ce, (1)
where pe is his expected severance payrnent (which depends also on the
probability that the manager will be fired).
If the manager is not fired at the end of the first period, he will receive
a fixed wage W~ in the second period. If he is fired, he is assumed to be
able to obtain his second-period reservation wage somewhere else.
3 The First Best
The shareholder's payoff is maximised if he can observe perfectly both the
type of the manager and his firing cost at the end of the first period, and if
he can commit ex ante (i.e., at the start of the first period when contracts
are signed) to a firing rule which depends on the realised firing cost. The
resulting solution will be termed the first best.~
Firing a bad manager and replacing him with a randomly selected new
manager at the end of the first period raises t.he expected cash-flow of the
firm in the second period Uy 0~, while firing a good manager reduces the
expected future cash-flow of the firm by Oti. To induce a manager to run
the firm, he has to be compensated for his expected firing cost.s. WLile ex
yost the shareholder would always want to fire a bad manager, from an ex
ante point. of view, in those cases where the realised firing cost exceeds the
expected increase in the second-period cash-flow of the firm, the shareholder
wotild not. want. to fire the manager.
~Note that if the firíng decision does not depend on the value of p, compensation for
expected firing costs could instead take place through a higher s. The distinction between
s and p becomes relevant only in Section 5.2.
~'Strictly speaking, the ídeal situation for a s},areholder woidd be if he knew the type of
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Suppose first that C c ~Et (see Figure 2(a)). Even from an e~ ante point
of view the shareholder would always want to fire a bad manager. Hence,
the value of commitment to an optimal firing rule, based on the realised
firing cost, is zero.
Now suppose that C~ ~Ft (see Figure 2(b)). Ex ante it would be
optimal tu fire only if c G Ott and not to fire if c~ ~Ft. The value of
conunitment. for the shareholder is the sum of t.wo components. The first
component is the reduction in the compensation that the manager requires
for the expected firing cost he incurs, zC - 2( c) z0~, where C-E[cJ-
ZC, Here, ?C is the compensation he requires if he is always fired when
he t.urns out. to be bad. If the shareholder catr cnmmlt himself to only
firing a bad manager if c G ~p, the mauager requires a compensation of
i~~~ 10~r. This is the probability that he is bad, ;, times the probability
that c c OEt, times the expected firing eost conditional on c G DFt, which
is 2~~t. The second component, is (minus) the reduction in the expected
second-period cash-fíow froln not. alwa,ys firing a bad manager in the case
of commitaneut, 20E1- 2(~) OFt. Always (instead of never) firing a bad
manager raises the expected cash-flow with the probability that the manager
is bad, 2, times the expected increase in the cash-flow from firing the bad
manager, DEt. Only firing a bad manager if c G OFt, merely raises the
expected cash-f}ow by the probability that the manager is bad, times the
probability that c G 0~, ~, times the expected increase in the cash-flow
from firing the bad manager. Hence, the value of conuuitment is:
~zC-2~~~z0lt~-~z01r-2~~~Op~-4 ~ rl`~. (~)
Not surprisingly, for given DEt (G C, ) the value of commitment is increasing
in C.
64 No Director
From now on we assume that the shareholder neither observes the type of
the manager, nor his firing cost. at the encí of the first period.~ Therefore,
the onl,y information upon which the shareholder can base his firing decision
is the realisation of the first-period cash-flow, xl. More specifically, at the
start of the first period the firm and the manager sign a contract which
specifies a fixed threshold r for xt. The manager will be fired at the end of
the first period if ancí only if xl G r.
The sharcholder chooses the threshold T so as to maximise his expected
payoff.~ The only re,levant variables that enter his objective fimction are
the expected cash-flow of the firm in the second period, denoted b,y x., the
fixed salary of the manager in the first period, and the expected severance
payment at the end of the first period. These are the variables that depend
on the firing decision, and, hence, are affected by the threshold. Because
there is no rea5on to pay the manager morc than his reservation cvage, the
participation constraint of the managcr will be binding. Hence, using (1)
with eyuality, one has:
SV - x2 - S- Pe - y2 - 6~V,,, - ce, (S)
where SV is the shareholder value. Tltroughout, we thus ignore the man-
ager's second-period salary as well a.ti the contribution of the expected first-
period cashflow (jl) to the shareholder value. This is irrelevant for any of
the results.
We can write (3) as:
Sv - É~ - I~m f z ~Fe (T) - Fc (r)10~ t z fFs (T) i- Fc(T)1 c, (4)
where FB (.) and Fr;(.) are the distribution functions corresponding to fp (.)
and f~ (.), respectively.
The iutuit.ion for (4) is as follows. If the shareholder would never fire
a managcr (r - 0), the shareholder value is simpl,y the average cash-fiow
of the firtn minus the reservation wage of the manager (j~ - W). If a
threshold r~ 0 is imposed, the shareholder will fire a bad manager with
~' We assume also that, in the absence of a director, the manager is not able to observe
his own type at the end of the first period. This predudes the possibility of a long-term
revelation contract between the shareholder and the manager such that the first best (see
Section 3) is achieved.
~One can show that the optimal threshold yields the highest payoff to the shareholder
of all possible contracts where the choice to fire or not is based on x~ only.
7probability 2FB (r), which is the probability t.hat the manager is bad times
the probability that ar G r, given that the manager is bad. Similarly, the
shareholder will fire a goocí manager with probability 2F~ (r), which reduces
the expected second-period cash-flow by OFe. Finally, the expected cost of
setting a threshold is z(Fe (T) f F~ (r)]C. This is the probability that the
manager is fired, 2[FB (r) t Fc (r)], times his average firing cost, C.
Differentiating the right-hand side of (4) yields t.he necessary and, in this
case, sufhcient first-order coudition for r:
C- Jar-c' .~
fP~tltfG ri ~. (S)
Hence, the optimal threshold, denoted by r", is:
T' - zX(1 -~), If C, ~ ~Í~, (6)
where we have used the distributional properties reported in Figure í. If
C~ OEc, the shareholder sets r' - Q Because the expected firing cost
exceeds the expected increase in the cash-flow of the firm in this case, it is
optimal not to impose a positive threshold. Equation (6) shows that the
threshold is always below ZX. Moreover, r' rs positively related Lu ~3F and
negatively related to C. An increase in ~Ei raises the likelihood that. a below-
average performance, i.e. x~ G 2X, can be attributed to the managet being
bad. Ceteris paribus, an increase in C raises the expected firing cost for
the manager and thus requires the shareholder to offer him a higher salary.
To compensate for this, the shareholder sets a higher threshold, thereby
reducing the probability that. the manager will be fired.
Finally, for r- r`, the shareholder value is:
~- W,n f 4~{~ - z C(1 - 2 p~), SV-~
~1 - tii~m r
if C G O~i,
if C ? O~a.
(7)
Higher average firing costs reduce the shareholder value (if C c OFe). The
reason is that the shareholder has t.o compensate the manager for the higher
expected firing cost by increasing his salary accordingly.
The current arrangement invoh~ing a threshold is dominated by the first
best (see Section 3) for two reasons. The first is that the shareholder no
longer perfectly observes the type of the manager. He can make either one
of two errors: firing a good manager or not firing a baci manager. The sec.ond
reason is that, because t.he shareholder does not observe the realisat.ion of
the firing cost, he cannot commit himself to not firiug the manager if c? 0}e.
85 Introducing a Director
From now on, the shareholder can delegate the firing decision to a director.
The direct.or may be expected to have more information about the manager
than the shareholder. According to Fama (1980), the director can be viewed
as a market-induced institution, `[...] whose most important role is to scru-
tinize the highest decision makers in the firm.' In his role of monitoring the
manager, the director can obtain and use confidential information about the
firm and t.he manager. This information is not always at the disposal of the
shareholders, for example in order to avoid that competitors would profit
from it. In particular, we assume that the director can observe the type of
the manager perfectly at the end of the first period. This assumption may
be motivated by the fact that the director often is a director at other firms
as well. Comparing the performance ofthese other firms wit.h the firm under
consideration enables the director to infer whether the manager is good or
bad. Finally, we assume that also the manager himself observes his type
at the end of the first period. This should not be unreasonable for a firm
in which the manager interacts with his director on a sufficiently frequent
ha.5is.
The reservation wage of the director is Wd 1 0. We assume that Wd
is not too large, because otherwise it wotild not be profitable to have a
director at alL Specifically, it turns out that the following restriction will be
convenient:
Wd G (Éc t 20~) Min [l, ó~] . (8)
We assume that the director receives a proportion a 1 0 of the second-
period cash-flow of the firm. This should give him an incentive, albeit. not
always perfect, to make the appropriate firing decision from the viewpoint
of the shareholder. Such a simple, linear incentive scheme can be motivated
as follows. First, it captures the spirit of most of the incentive schemes
implemented in practice, namely providing a simple link between reward
and performance. Second, it yields the basic result of this paper, i.e., that
collusion can be beneficial for the shareholder. This result also holds for
more sophisticated incentive schemes (see Footnote 10 below).
The shareholder is not able to verify the information of the director.
Hence, there is a potential for collusion between the manager and the direc-
t.or. More specificall,y, we allow for the possibility that the manager offers a
bribe to the director in order to influence his firing decision.
The shareholder value, the participation constraint of the manager, and
ythe participatiou constraint of the director, are given by, respectively:
SV - x2 - s- p` - axzi (9)
1V Gs ~1~e-ce-be, (10)
Wd G as2 f be, (11)
where b" is the expected bribe paid by the manager to the director in order
t.o influence his firing decision.
5.1 No Collusion
For the moment, we disregard the possibility of collusion. Hence, 6" drops
out of ( 10) and ( 11). Therefore, the payoff to the director depends only on
the second-period cash-flow of the firm. Hence, for any n 1 0, the director
will always fire a bad manager, but never 6re a good manager. Therefore,
firing takes place with probability 2. This implies that ~2 - 2~ f 2Fic -
~ f Z~Ei. The expected firing cost is 2C, which is the probability that a
manager is bad multiplied by the average firing cost.
Define ~o as the minimum value of a for which the participation con-
straint of t.he director, (11), is satisfied. Hence,
ao - }F~ ~ 0. (12)
Íi f 2~Fi
Observe that a~ G 1, as implied by (8). Because the firing decision of the
director is independent of a(if a 1 0), it is optimal for the shareholder ta
set cr - ao. Combined with the fact that (10) is binding, this implies that:
SV-ji~-ZOfi-W„~-ZC-Wd. (13)
To compare this with the shareholder value in the absence of a director,
one has to distinguish between the case in which the shareholder would
choose t,o set T' - 0(i.e., if C~ OEi) and the case in which he would set
r' ) 0(i.e., if C c Op). -
C?D~a : Comparing (13) and the second line of (7), we see that the
shareholder would want to hire a director if and only if:
Wd G z(~p - C). (14)
Hence, in this case (C10p), the shareholder would never hire a director.
The intuition is straightforward. The director, who observes the type of
10the manager perfectly, will always fire a bad manager. However, he does
not take into account t-he (ex ante) compensat.ion that the manager requires
for his expected firing cost, C, which exceeds the increase in the expected
second-period cash-How from always firing a bad manager.
Cc~~: Comparing (13) and the first line of (7), it follows that the
shareholder would hire a director if and only if:
z
4Vd G Qpf~ 1 - ~óv~ (15)
Because the right-hand side of ( 15) is positive, a director is hired if his
reservation wage is not too high. Hiring a director is more profitable if Op
is larger and if the average firing cost., C, is lower.
5.2 Collusion
Now we allow for the possibility that the manager pays a bribe to the director
at the end of the first period in order to influence his firing decision. The
ahareholder takes this into accnunt whan sattinE the cnmpensation sChemes
at the start of the first period. He optimises over n, s and p. Because
the severance payment is paid only when t.he manager is fired, it will affect
the expected bribe. Hence, there is an independent role for the severance
payment now.
F;~~,,, :1: ert,,,..:~~,, ~,,,,,, r,.~„,..,,n„it,,,, „~ ~~,~ .~~,,,~ q,.,,u,,..;,,,, ;., f„~..,.,i,t,..
Figure 3 shows the extensive form representation of the new game. At
the start ofthe first períod the shareholder (S) se]ects a, y and s. At the end
of the first. period there is a move by nature (N) concerning the rnalisation
11of the firing cost, c, and the type of the manager. The mauager, G(ood)
ur B(ad), each possibility with probability z, can then offer a'take-it-or-
leave-it' bribe to the director in order to influence his firiug decision. The
offer is denoted by the combination (bp,6,vF) and h~tis the following form:
'`I pay yon 6p, if you fire me and b~,p if you do not fire me." On the basis
of this offer, the dirc~ctor either fires (F) the manager or does not fire (NF)
him (decision nodes D). We assume that the manager and the director both
stick to the agreement, if the latter accepts the offer.
Figure 3 also shows the (expected) payoffs for each outcome. As before,
we include only those variables that are affected by the actions in the game
tree. It is easy to derive the payoffs from equations (9) to (11). Because the
ganre is one of perfect information, we can use backwards induction to solve
for the Subgame Perfect Equilibria.
The first step is to investigate~ the incentives of the director to flre at the
end of the first period. In Section 5.1 we saw that in the absence ofcollusion
the director will always fire a bad manager and never fire a good manager. If
collusion is allowed, both a bací manager and a good manager may have an
incentive to bribe the director in order to change his firing intentions. A bací
ntanager would be prepared to offer a bribe uI uN to (r. - p) if this inducee
the director not to fire him. The director accepts this bribe íf it is not lower
than his expected gain from firing (a0fe). Therefore, if c 1 p f aOEi, the
bad manager successfully offers a bribe of a0p and is not fired. A good
manager woulci be prepared to offer a bribe of up to (p - o) if this induces
the director to fire him. This bribe is accepted if it equals or exceeds the
director's expected loss from firing a good manager (a0~c). Therefure, if
c G p- a,'~~, the good manager succ.essfull,y offers a bribe of a~fa and is
fired.
However, we argue thak at an uptimum (a",p`) it. should be the case
that p` c a"Op: hence, a good manager is never fired. Suppose that the
opposite holds. Then, for every realisation of c stnaller than (p' - a"DIi),
a good manager will succeed in bribíng the director to fire him. However,
such a value~for ~i cannot. be optimal: recíucing p to cx'OFi inereases the
probability that a bad manager is not fired, but, to the samc extent, also
decreases the probability that a goud manager is fired. Therefore, the net
effect on the expc~ca.ed cash-flow of tlre firm is nil, while the expected firing
cust is reduced (so that s-F pe is reduced).
A bad rnanager is fired with probability ~~ G 1. This ineyuality
holds at an optimum because any choices of p and a such that p f a~Er 1 C
can be improved upon by decreasing a: this does not chauge the incentives
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The director receives a proportion a of the expected cash-flow of the firm,
plus the expected bribe from the manager. Using (16) and (19) the director's
expected payoff is:
ayz f be - a(Frf 2 0Ir). (20)
The expected payoff depends only on a and not on p. This is not surprising.
The expected second-period cash-flow of a firm with a direckor who always
fires bad managers and never fires good managers is 2jl ~- 2~c~ -~ f zOFe.
If a director is bribed into not firing a bad manager, the expected cash-flow
decreases. Hence, for a bribe to be successful, it must. at least cornpensate
the director for his loss from a reduced expected cash-flow. However, the
manager will otfer the lowest possible bribe, which is llre uu~ thdt exactly
cornpe,nsates for this loss.
Because p' c a'Op, (17) and (18) imply that P` G ce. In addition,
because W„~ ~ 0, one has (by (10)) that s~ 0. However, becattse s does
not affect the firing decision of the director, the shareholder can set s such
that the participation constraint of the manager (10) is binding.
Finally, combining (9), (1Q, with equality), (16), (18), and (20), we ob-
tain the following expression for the shareholder value, which is to be max-
imised over a and p:
sv-~t~~c~o~,,-um-z ~~z(~fao~)-a(F~fzo~). (aI)
From (20), ao as defined by (12) is again the minimum value of a for
which the part.icipation constraint. of the director is biuding. F~u~thermore,
define à as the optimum for n if we ignore tlre participation constraint for
the director. In the Appendix we prove the following two propositions:
Proposition 1: Suppose that Op 1 C, that is, thc expected difference
between the cash-flow generated by a good or a bad manager and the
cash-flow of an average managcr exceeds the maximum firing cost.
13(a) If ri G rx~ (i.e., the participation constraint of the director is binding),
then a' - cxo. In this case, p' is equal to the minimwn of aoOEr and
C - ao~~.
(b) If et , ao (i.e., thc participation constraint of the dircctor is not binding
at the optimal unconstrained cx), then cx` - ri and p' - n~~t at. the
optimal solution.
Here, ix - rnax[0, miu( zgrórc , z~~)[. p ~
Proposition 2: Suppose that D~c G C, that is, the maximum firing cost
exceeds the expected difference between the cash-flow generated by
a good or a bad manager and the cash-flow of an average manager.
Then, n' - ae aud p' is the minimum of ao0fi and (1 - cxe)~~i.
The intuition Eor Proposition 1(a) is as follows. If rr c cxo, the share-
holder has to set rx at cxo, because a lower value for a violates the partic-
ipation constraint of the director, while a higher value for a reduces the
shareholder value, as follows from the definition of á. Because Ofa 1 C,
firing a bad manager is (ex a,nt.e) effittient f4L every realization of c. Given
that a bad manager will not be fired if c ? p' fa' OEc, the shareholder sets p
as high as possible, with the exception that p' cannot be higher than cz"~Fr.
Otherwise, a good manager would get. fired with positive probability. This
is not optimal, as we argued earlie~r. If à 1 ao (Proposition 1(b)), then,
again by definition of [2~, the~ shareholder sets a- ïx. As in Proposit.ion 1(a),
he wants to set Y as high as possible. That is, he sets p- rk~fi~
Although from an ex-ante perspective it would always be optimal to
fire a bad manager, under the optimal arrangement. (a',p') collusion will
occur with positive probability whenever p' - ct"O~r. The reason is as
follows. The shareholder would rather set the severance payment higher in
those cases. However, chis would result in a good manager being firecí with
positive probability.
Now, suppose that OFa C C(Proposition 2). In this case, firing a bad
manager is ex-ante efficient only if c E [0, DEaJ, because if c) 4Fr, the firing
cost exceeds the expected increase in the fitture cash-flow. Under the optimal
arrangentent (rr',fi`) collusion will always occur with posit.ive probabilit.y.
"The final part of the Proposition 1 impLies that n G(7~ (2~p.). The intuition is as
follows. Suppose that the opposite is true, i.e. à) C~ (2~p). In that case, thc shareholder
can decrease rz and simultaneously increase p without changing the firing decision of the
directoc This yields the same expected auh-f1ow, but a lower r.xpected salary for the
director, which contradicts the optimality of á.
14To avoid that a good manager can get. fired, the shareholder sets p at ac~~f~,
if nc'~fr G (1 - nu)DEi. Otherwise, he sets 1i - (1 - act)Ofe, which prevents
collusion between the bad manager and the director if 0 G c G ~Fi, but.
inch~;es them to collude if c~ Ofi.
6 When is it Optimal to Allow for Collusion?
Sttppose that the shareholder is able to (costlessly) prevent the possibility
of collusion, for example through intensified monitoring of the director or
through provisions in the corporate charter or the corporate law which make
it easier to punisL a director for bad decisions. Under what. circumstances
should t.hc shareholder prevent collusion'?
To address this question, we ncrd to distinguish between DEr 1 C and
OEr C C. If ~~ ~ C, then firing a bad manager is always efficient from an cx
ante perspective. 'I'his is precisely what a non-colluding director establishes.
Hence, in this case, it would be optimal to prevent collusion.
Now, suppose that ~p c C. Hence, if c E [OFr,C], firing a bad manager
would no longer be efficient from an ex ante perspective. A colluciing director
is bribed by a bad manager if c ~ a'Ofa t p'. As discussecí in Sectiun 3,
this is bad for the shareholder if c E [a'DErt p', ~~), but it is beneficial for
him if c E(O~, C].~t
To see whether preventing the possibility of collusion may be in the
interest of the shareholder, we compare his losses (relative to those unde,r
the first best, see Section 3) for the case where collusion is allowed with
those for the case where it is prevented. The first best reyuires that a bad
manager be fired if and only if c E (0, ~fe]. When colhtsion is prevented, a
bad manager is fired also when c E [Ott,C]. The expected loss (relative to
that for the first best) associated with prevention is:
2 ~ [2 (C f Ok) - Op], (22)
which is the probability that a manager is bad, z, multiplied by the probabil-
ity tltat the firing decision would he (ex arate) inef6cient, c~~~`,multiplied
by the expected loss associated with inefficient firiug, z (C -~ Ofe) - Ofe.
When collusion is allowed, it takes place whenever the manager is bací
and c 1 a'Ott f p`. The optimal arrangetnent (cr', p') in Section 5.2 tltus
makes a trade-off between having collusion from t.ime to tiure when this
would not be ex ante efficient, i.e. if c E [ce'~tr -t- p', ~f.e), and collusion
'Note that a'Op t p' C ~p, as follows from Proposition ?.
IJoccurring when this is indeed cx arate effic~ieut. Hence, the difference between
the case where collusion is allowed artd the first best (see Section 3) is that
in the fonner case a bad manager is not fired if c E [n'~Ei f p', ~p). If
(1 - rto)OFe C ceo0fa, this interval is empty (vs follows from Propositions 1
and 2) and the solution with colhrsion being allowed in fact. coincides with the
first best. In the following we therefore a5sume that (I - ao) OFe 1 cro0~r.
Compared with the first best, t.he loss associated with allowing for collusion
is:
2 0~`- ".oF`tP [~p - 2(DEc f o`OEi f p')], (23)
which is the probability that a manager is bad, 2, multiplied by the probabil-
ity that not firing a bad manager would be (ex ante) inefficient, o~`-(~ o~tP 1 C
nrultiplied by the expected opportunity cost of not firing a bad manager,
Oft- 2(~fatct'OFe-I-p").
Expression (22) is increasing in C, while expression (23) is decreasing
in C. Hence, a larger vah~e of C increases the desirability of allowing for
collusion. For C sufficiently large, expression (23) is smaller than expression
(22), i.e., allowing Eor collusion is better than preventing collusion. The
reason is that the possibilit,y of collusion offsets part of the loss associated
with the failure to comrnit to not firing a bad mauager if his firing cost is
relatively high.tl~
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have argued that collusion betweeu the Board of Directors
and the management of a hnn is not always bad for the shareholders of the
firm. In particular, collusion alleviates the costs associated with the failure
to commit to not firing a bad manager if his personal firing cost is relatively
high. The possibilit.y of collusiott reduces the compensation required by the
manager.
Our analysis may explain why management. salarias are substantiall,y
higher in the Anglo-Saxon system than in many other countries. In the
Anglo-Saxon system, managers require more compensat.ion because of a
~~~ Note that any incentive scheme for a director with a positive relation between x2 and
his salary gives him the íncentive never to fire a goorl manager, and always to fire a bad
manager. As in the case of a linear incentive sr.hemr„ it would then be effir.ient to have
collusion if c E ~0{r,C~. Hence, although one might 6e able to devise bette.r inrentive
schemes ( from the shareholder's perspective) than the linear scheme, this does not change
the basic insight that it may be profitable to allow for collusion.
16higher risk to be fired. This arises from the fact that it is relatively easy for
shareholders to fire a manager.
An interesting direction for further research would be to allow for the
possibility to 6re the director in the case of a bad performance by the firrn or
the manager. This may reduce the scope for collusion between the cíirector
and the manager. However, if allowing for collusion is in the int.erest. of
the shareholder, this would be au argument in favour of legal restrictions
on the ease with which directors can be fired. In many European countries
such restrictions exist. Therefore, such an analysis could shecí some light on
the advantages and disadvantages of the various corporate systerns that we
observe. In particular, it. may contribute to the current discussion about the
disadvantages of the alleged shareholder short:termism in the Anglo-Saxon
system [Miles (1993,1995) and Satchell and Damant (1995)].
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Appendix
In this Appendix we prove Propositions 1 and 2. The shareholder maximises
(21) over a and p. Dropping terms that do not depend on a and p, we can
write the shareholder's problem as:







18The first constraint has been discussed in the text and ensures that a good
manager is never fired. The second constraint, also discussed in the text,
ensures that the probability (p ~- ceDEi)~C does not exceed one. The t.hird
constraint is the participatiou constraint of the director.
Note that
~áy~- C -~~-~bp-(1-o)0{r.
Case 1 (Ofa 1 C)
(A.I)
For the moment, ignore the constraint a 1 ao. The admissible area is
the triangle OAB. For a given a, SV' is a quadratic function of p, which
reaches its maxirnum for p - (1 - a)~p (A.I). Hence, the optimum must be
located on OA or AB. Suppose that it is located on AB. Then, p-~ a0p -
C. This can be substituted into the objective function, which reduces to
SV' - ~Ei - ZC - 2a(Fi -I- zOEa). Hence, a should be chosen as low as
possible. Hence, if the optimum is located on AB, it must be at A. But
this implies that it is located on OA. Hence, p- aON. Substitute this into
the objective function to eliminate p. r4aximise the resulting fimction with
respect. to a and apply the restriction that 0 G~ c C~(20p) (to ensure
that the optimum is located on the line piece OA). If we use in addition that
ja f 2~Ei - z0~c (see Fígure 1), we obtain:
19á - max[O,min(2oó~c, 2ó )]. v ~ (A.II)
Finally, apply the constraint a~ ao, which we have neglected so far. Be-
cause ao C C)~p, as follows from (8), we have:
0 0 - 1 aoOEe, if ao G 2~ ,
Ifn c a,thena`-a andp'-t o c ó c C- a Of~, if 20~~ c a c ó~.
If á~ ao, then a' - á and p' - nOf~.
Case 2 (~E~ G C)
tr r`~;. ~ ~
In this case, OAB is again the admissable azea, and by (A.I) the optimal
solution must be located on OD or on DE. As before, if the solution lies on
DE, it must be located at D. Going through similar steps as in Case 1, we
obtain
á - max[O,ntin(2oóuc, Z)~ - 0. (A.III)
Applying that a? ao yields the solution
a' - ao and p'
ao0p,o if ao G!,
- (1 - a ) OFa, if 2 G a~ C 1.
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